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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
V .	12 Cr. 376 (RMB)
RUDY KURNIAWAN,	
Defendant.	
x	
	New York, N.Y. August 7, 2014 9:40 a.m.
Before:	
HON. RICHARD M.	
	District Judge
APPEARANCE	S
PREET BHARARA  United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York STANLEY J. OKULA	
Assistant United States Attorne	У
JEROME MOONEY VINCENT S. VERDIRAMO	
Attorneys for Defendant	

(Case called)

THE COURT: We have a few things to go over. You may remember from our last in-court session we put the matter over to today for first a hearing and then for the sentencing itself.

In the interim, the lawyers have been working diligently, one with the other, and it appears that there is no need for a hearing because there is either agreement or agreement to disagree on certain items that I'll need to resolve.

Let's start with this, a brief hearing from the lawyers for both sides. I received a letter dated August 5, 2014 from Mr. Mooney and one of the topics of the hearing that had been scheduled was Mission Fine Wines. I have a question for you when you address this issue. It seems as if the government and the defense agreed on a number of \$2 million.

MR. OKULA: Yes, your Honor.

MR. MOONEY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I thought the number was \$2,326,450, from the report in question. So maybe you could address that when you speak.

Then the David Doyle was another sort of big-ticket item. If I understand correctly, the defense agrees that David physically is owed 15.11 million in restitution but that for the loss amount the number is somewhere around 8 million plus.

That's the way I understand it.

I'm happy to hear from both the government and Mr. Mooney as to why we don't need the hearing and what's been agreed to and what's still open.

In any order you like.

MR. OKULA: I'm happy to have Mr. Mooney go first, your Honor, because I think that would establish a certain baseline in terms of what we have agreed to.

MR. MOONEY: I think that makes sense, your Honor.

First of all, your Honor raised the question of Mission Fine Wines. The report did show \$2.3 million in current value. And we had still some questions with regards to some of the bottles that were included and whether those were properly allocated or should be properly allocated to Mr. Kurniawan.

We also had serious questions, and it's similar to what we phrased with Mr. Doyle, with regards to the process of using current values for wines when, in fact, for the purposes of loss calculation it ought to be what was actually paid back at the time, and so that undercuts that.

What happened, there was negotiations that we entered into with regards to Mission and our figure was like 1.5 million and their figure was someplace between 2 and a half and three million. Ultimately we arrived at a figure of 2 million. And it was my understanding that Mission also agreed to the \$2

million and that's why it's a settlement of the parties for the purposes of both restitution and loss.

THE COURT: Mr. Okula.

MR. OKULA: It is a settlement for the purpose of restitution and loss in the \$2 million figure, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm happy to adopt that figure then under those circumstances.

How about David Doyle?

MR. MOONEY: With respect to David Doyle, we have a similar kind of situation, your Honor. And what happens with David Doyle, the first document that we received from Mr. Doyle with respect to the situation was an inventory, Exhibit B, prepared by Susan Twellman that is the 1500 bottles of wine that Ms. Twellman says were purchased from Mr. Kurniawan, that upon his arrest they put together and stuck away in the warehouse, and then they created this list.

And, once again, what we have on this list is the current value of those wines. If the wine was what it was supposed to be, they are telling us that the current value of those would be \$17.7 million for those 1500 bottles. That's today's value. As we pointed out in the letter, for the purposes of restitution, your Honor could use current value.

We have had some negotiations with Mr. Doyle's lawyers. We have also had discussions with the government with regards to it. Because they have come up with a current

valuation that exceeds the 15.11 million that the government was claiming, we are in agreement that for the purposes of restitution the 15.11 million dollar figure is appropriate and can be used. We still think that some of these things in here are a little high, but we are agreeing to that number primarily because they have a justification that they have put forward that makes sense.

THE COURT: Is it also your position that for purposes of loss calculation the number is \$8,862,000?

MR. MOONEY: We think that the appropriate number for loss should be half of what the current value is.

THE COURT: What's that number?

MR. MOONEY: And that number is \$8,840,000, your Honor.

THE COURT: \$8,840,000.

MR. MOONEY: Correct.

We don't have all the data. One of the things, if you recall, one of the things that we were pushing for and that we were unhappy about was that we needed to see what did he pay for the wine. We didn't have that information. That information was then supplied. On Monday we received it from Mr. Doyle's lawyers. It's incomplete. It doesn't have everything. But that's okay. One would not expect necessarily to have everything for purchases from 2005 to 2008. But it gave us a substantial amount of information and it allowed us

to then go through.

And to the extent that we could, we went through the list and marked down the differences between what was paid for the wine and what the current values of the wines were. And you get things. For example, a magnum of the 1921 Chateau Chival Blanc is being shown on the inventory, \$20,810.

Mr. Doyle purchased it from Mr. Kurniawan for \$10,000. The 1947 Chateau Chival Blanc magnum is listed on the inventory at \$22,982. It was purchased for \$12,500. Some of them are dramatically high. Some of them, in all fairness, have stayed about the same and maybe even dropped a little. The 1961 Chateau Haut Brion is shown at \$7,049, whereas 6,000 was paid for the same bottles and 800,000 was paid for some others. I can go through more of them.

THE COURT: I just wanted to establish that you feel you can go forward without a hearing, which is, I think, what you all indicated to me, based on the record, and you will argue what the record shows.

MR. MOONEY: That's correct, your Honor. That's correct. We think that in the record, as we have it now, with the materials that we presently have, there is sufficient information for your Honor to make appropriate findings.

THE COURT: You agree with that, Mr. Okula?

MR. OKULA: I do.

THE COURT: Just one other thing. We are discussing

these figures. The last time we pointed out that the amount of loss is a driver of the sentence that Mr. Kurniawan will receive in the sense that in a fraud case the guideline range, which albeit is no longer mandatory, but is something that we still pay attention to, it's one of the factors that we look at. So the guideline range of incarceration is a function of the total amount of loss, which is why you all and the Court have been spending all this time trying to figure out what the amount of loss is, A, and, B, it makes a pretty big difference if the loss is somewhere between 7 and \$20 million as opposed to being between 20 and \$50 million. Isn't that right?

MR. OKULA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: We are really arguing about where in those two categories the loss is. And just before we go further, do I understand the defense to be saying that the loss, adding up Fascitelli, Doyle, Devine, Koch, Mission Fine Wines, Spectrum, Andrew Hobson, Reid Buerger, and Acker Merral is 19 million plus? Is that where you are?

MR. MOONEY: That's correct, your Honor. We are at 19.2 million.

THE COURT: You are 800,000 shy of this threshold?

MR. MOONEY: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you, Mr. Okula, are well over the 20 million. You're somewhere, in fact, in the 30 million, 35 million dollar range, right?

MR. OKULA: I think that's correct, your Honor, yes.

MR. MOONEY: I think your Honor mentioned Acker

Merral. Acker Merral is not a victim in this.

THE COURT: I thought the defense chart showed Acker Merral for \$450,000.

MR. MOONEY: No. I think that's somebody else.

Excuse me. That's the Acker Merral & Condit auction. That is the 450,000, Truly Hardy's testimony.

THE COURT: Did either of you want to say anything preliminary? This is going to take some time because there are lots of details. We have also done a rather close examination, particularly in the area of loss, because there is so much at stake here. And where we could, we did a bottle-by-bottle analysis. It is going to take me a little while to go through all that.

What I thought I would do is start the sentencing, there will come a time that I'll ask you again, unless you want to say anything further now, to comment: Defense, Mr. Kurniawan, Mr. Okula. And then there will be another opportunity if you any of the three of you wanted to add anything further.

MR. OKULA: I think that would be helpful, your Honor.

Might I suggest the following, that your Honor closed essentially the argument with respect to Mr. Fascitelli and Andrew Hobson at the close of the last hearing. Stated another

way, the only thing that we were going to dispute or argue today was really Doyle and Mission Fine Wines.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. OKULA: I think if your Honor is prepared to announce where you come out on that, based on the current record, it could influence heavily the length of the proceedings because if you find, for instance, that the full amount of the Fascitelli loss is appropriate above 5 million, that's going to put the guidelines loss even for Mr. Kurniawan's position above 20 million, which is going to make academic any further argument on that point.

THE COURT: I get that. I am going to do it the long way so we have a record in one place. Admittedly it will take a little bit longer. I am prepared to give you my impression of what the loss is for each of them. And I think, even if it's somewhat repetitious, I am going to do it again.

We are here then today for sentencing of Mr. Kurniawan following his convictions on December 18, 2013 of one count of mail fraud and one count of wire fraud. These related to his manufacture and sale of counterfeit high-end wines and also to his obtaining a \$3 million revolving loan from Fine Art Capital, which is a subsidiary of Emigrant Bank. He did that, the latter, by providing false information to the bank, including that he was a permanent resident of the United States, which he is not, and also by pledging assets to secure

that revolving credit loan, and those assets included paintings by prominent artists, including Andy Warhol and Damien Hirst, among others, which he also pledged to other creditors.

I thought it would be useful, again, to have in one place, not necessarily required for sentencing, but a brief summary of the principal phases of this case, and they are, as I understand them, the following:

First, for the arrest and remand, Mr. Kurniawan was arrested at 9638 East Naomi Avenue in Arcadia, California, where he was living with his mother, on March 8, 2012. Central District of California Magistrate Judge Hillman at the time of his arrest imposed home incarceration with electronic monitoring. There was an appeal by the government of that initial bail package. That appeal was heard by Southern District of New York District Court Judge Denise Cote on March 19, 2012, and at that time, incidentally, the defendant and his then attorneys, as well as two Southern District of New York Assistant U.S. Attorneys, appeared from the Central District of California by video conference. That was with Judge Cote, who was here in New York. And Judge Cote denied bail which had been set and ordered a remand of Mr. Kurniawan.

No subsequent bail application has been made to me since that time. And on May 23, 2012, I advised

Mr. Kurniawan's former counsel, Michael Proctor, of the following. I said to him: I don't actually know what your

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position is, Mr. Proctor with respect to bail, if you are seeking a new determination or if you are comfortable with Judge Cote's ruling. That's in the transcript of May 23, 2012 where Mr. Proctor responds: We are not seeking a new bail determination today, your Honor. We are still continuing to explore bail resources, and I would not be surprised if there was an application to your Honor at some point in the process. Mr. Kurniawan is a citizen of Indonesia and he has been detained ever since his arrest, which is now over two years ago, and there is a likely immigration hold on him based upon his being a foreign national and also based upon an earlier denial of his application for political asylum in the United States, and an order of his removal from the United States. So that's I'm calling phase 1 or that's one aspect of the case, historically.

2 relates to the same date and it relates to this search of Mr. Kurniawan's home pursuant to a search warrant on March 8, 2012 from which search was obtained evidence that was introduced in the trial of this case in December of last year, and that evidence included, without limitation, numerous wine bottle labels, seals, wax, corks, cork remover, cork inserter, laser printer, wine bottles, some of which were full, some of which were empty, some of which were partially full, computers, et cetera. That search was the subject of a defense motion to suppress any evidence seized from Mr. Kurniawan's home on the

grounds principally that the FBI agents involved in the search allegedly conducted an unlawful, what's called protective sweep of Mr. Kurniawan's home. That motion was opposed by the government through a written submission, and at the time neither the defense nor the government requested a hearing on the motion to suppress. Rather, the parties stipulated that an evidentiary hearing was not required. And that motion was the subject of a separate written opinion and order by me dated January 17, 2013. And attached, incidentally, to that order as Exhibit A is a color photo view from the threshold front door of Mr. Kurniawan's home.

And in that order I determined, among other things, that the search of Mr. Kurniawan's home was lawful and that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant by United States Magistrate Judge Michael R. Wilner of the Central District of California, a search warrant which he authorized on March 18, 2012, based on several things, one of which was the criminal complaint against Mr. Kurniawan, dated March 5, 2012. That complaint included sworn statements of FBI agents tying the home to alleged criminal conduct. It was also based, the search warrant was, on what we call plain view items observed by law enforcement at the time of Mr. Kurniawan's arrest and which were described to Magistrate Judge Wilner. And it was also based upon the experience of law enforcement officers involved in the case.

I found that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant because, quote, under the totality of circumstances, there was fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the particular location, in this instance Mr. Kurniawan's home.

I relied in part for purposes of the probable cause analysis upon the plain view description provided by Agent Farache in his affidavit, dated March 8, 2012, in which he stated, in part, and among other things, from just inside the threshold of the subject Kurniawan's residence front door he observed certain items in plain view. That affidavit was presented to Magistrate Judge Wilner in support of the request for a search warrant.

In the probable cause analysis that's set forth in the opinion that I mentioned, dated January 17, 2013, I did not rely on the color photo taken by law enforcement officers at or about the time of Mr. Kurniawan's arrest, which depicted crates and bottles of wine stacked approximately 10 to 15 feet high in plain view of the threshold of Mr. Kurniawan's door because I understood at the time, and have no reason not to have that understanding now, that that photo itself was not presented to Magistrate Judge Wilner. And although the Court did not resolve the separate issue, conclusively, of a good-faith search, it found that it was not necessary to reach the good faith issue definitively because of the probable cause finding

made in that record. But I also determined that law enforcement agents who conducted the search of Mr. Kurniawan's home would have been entitled in good faith to rely on Judge Wilner's search warrant.

As you all know, under the good-faith exception, even absent probable cause, evidence will not be suppressed from the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant. Here the magistrate issues were objectively reasonable and the magistrate was not misled by statements made with reckless disregard for the truth.

I also determined in that order and opinion that the FBI was entitled to rely in good faith upon the search warrant issued by the magistrate and the photo. So the photo I thought and said was relevant to the good-faith issue and that's why it is attached to that opinion and order as Exhibit A. That's the second phase, so-called, or the second highlight of this case.

The third is the trial which began on December 9, 2013 and ended on December 18, 2013 with the jury verdict of guilty on both counts. There were approximately 16 witnesses, including, among others, Barbara Chu of Emigrant Bank, Truly Hardy of Acker Merral & Condit, FBI Agent James Wynne, French Burgundy vintners Laurent Ponsot so who said, "My idea was to wash the integrity of the terrior of Burgundy. It was starting a crusade against the fakers." That's Mr. Ponsot talking.

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During the trial Ponsot stated, among other things, when you are a winemaker, and when you see your bottles faked, the first idea you have is a bit of glory. You say, Wow, somebody is counterfeiting my wines. It means my wines are at a good level. But very quickly I said to myself -- this is Ponsot talking -- yes. But someone one day will open a bottle and will be disappointed because it's not the wine I made. And that is not good for the reputation of the winery. It's dirtying the spirit of the appellations of Burgundy." Christophe Roumier also testified at the trial. He said: wasn't sure. I just wrote down in French. But I said the wine was not authentic. This was my last word on it anyway because wine had, if I may say, a taste that is not the touch of tannins that we obtain in Burgundy." And Aubert Gaudin de Villaine also came, as you recall, came and spoke and said the Why are fake bottles and counterfeiting a problem for the domaine? It puts a cloud of doubt, you know, on the authenticity of the wines. And then a cloud of doubt is the beginning of less reputation. It's not good for the reputation of Burgundy in general and it can be very destructive. It puts a cloud of doubt on the authenticity of the wines, he said again. When somebody sees a bottle of Romanee-Conti or La Tache or any other wines, it puts a cloud of doubt. It's not good for your reputation.

We also heard from William Koch, from David Parker,

from Antonio Beltran Castanos, from Douglas Barzelay, who is a wine collector and who organized a dinner in 2007 to taste the so-called Cellar I and Cellar II auction wines. And he, Mr. Barzelay, said: But the wines were — there were so many of them that they were so self-evidently fraudulent. And Michael Egan, an expert, reviewed 267 bottles and found them to be all counterfeit. And Brian Kalliel said: I can tell you that he, referring to Mr. Kurniawan, always collected and brought back the bottles.

Those are the three phases I wanted to summarize.

Turning to sentencing, the rules of sentencing, as you know, have changed rather dramatically over the past six or seven years as a result of Supreme Court decisions in the Gall case, Gall v. United States, in the Kimbrough case, and in U.S. v. Booker, and also decisions from our own Second Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Crosby and U.S. v. Regalado, among other things. The upshot of these changes is that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, as they once were. Now they are a factor to be considered, but by no means the only factor.

And now, as a result of these decisions, we, the sentencing courts, are directed to look at a statute that's referred to as 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), which I have done at least preliminarily over the course of the last several months or so, while this sentencing has been pursued,

written about by the lawyers, the subject of numerous conferences, letters. I have had some opportunity preliminarily to consider these factors which go to the heart of sentencing, and they are as follows:

One is the nature and the circumstances of the offense or, in this case, offenses. There are two crimes. Another is the history and characteristics of the defendant. And then we seek to accomplish these objectives in sentencing: 1. Reflect the seriousness of the offense; another, to promote respect for the law; another, to provide a just punishment; another, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. So I think this sentence hypothetically implicates several of these factors and some of them I have yet to enumerate. I will pause for a moment because I think the issue of deterrence is quite important in this proceeding.

We also, as an objective, seek to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, to provide him as appropriate with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. And in doing all that we look at the kind of sentences available, the kinds of sentences and the sentencing range established in the sentencing guidelines over which we have spent numerous days pursuing the sentencing guidelines criteria and factors and range, even though, as I said at the outset, the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory.

They are just one of several of these factors that we consider.

We look at any policy statements issued by the sentencing commission, we seek to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly-situated defendants, and to provide for restitution.

Our practice as sentencing courts is to start with a guidelines analysis, where we have been for the last at least several weeks, perhaps months. And I will spend a fair amount of time yet in this discussion today on the guidelines analysis. I hope you will bear with me. It's a somewhat technical but, I suppose, worse than that, it's lengthy.

So the parties in this case, that is to say, the defense and the government, and also the probation department have made separate submissions about the guidelines analysis. And they each, the three of them, I won't say dispute one another, but they have come up with different sentencing guideline ranges. So the defense in this case says that the range of incarceration is between 70 and 87 months under the guidelines and that's based on what we call an offense level of 27 and a criminal history category of I. That's the defense position.

The government, on the other hand, says that the range is higher and that it's 135 to 168 months of incarceration based on what they believe is appropriate offense level, which is 33, and a criminal history category of I.

The probation department, which is an arm of the Justice Department, they did a calculation and they believe that the guideline range is yet higher still. They believe that the range is 168 to 210 months of incarceration based on an offense level of 35 and a criminal history category of I.

Most respectfully I am not going to consider much further the probation department's range. I think that I have discussed this with the lawyers. I think that it's incorrect. I think that in their analysis what the probation department did was to tack on Mr. Kurniawan's second guilty verdict, so to speak, for the Fine Art Capital situation.

I added that to the other fraud count and I think that appropriately that was not to happen, that in a case like this the conviction of the counterfeit wine is so much higher, that is to say, the guideline range, than the second count, that the second count is, I won't say disregarded, but is not cumulative. You can all address that if you feel differently when we come to it.

The principal difference among these three or a principal difference is, and we have talked about this on July 24, is the amount of loss, loss in these circumstances is a term of art and loss is defined as the actual loss and that means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense, plus the intended loss, which means the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense and

even, that is to say, the intended loss, even includes the pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur. An example given is a government sting operation where there really can't be an actual loss, but nevertheless the pecuniary loss intended, even in a sting operation where there will be no actual loss, is included in the definition of loss.

And under the guidelines, loss includes the value of all property taken, even though all or part of it may have been returned. That's found in <u>United States v. Brach</u>, 942 F.2d 141 a Second Circuit case from 1991.

So the big dispute, as I say, is the amount of loss. The defense, Mr. Mooney said a minute ago I think that the loss was 19.2 million, give or take, but not 20 million. And the government says that it's over 20 million, probably closer to 30, 35 million. It doesn't matter. The range is 20 to 50 million. So anywhere in that range would put you in a different category.

In its submission, dated May 1, 2014, the defense requests of the Court a sentence for Mr. Kurniawan of time served. So that means the time that he has already served, the defense is asking that that be his sentence today. And in that submission the defense explains how Mr. Kurniawan became involved in the wine business. It recounts that at age 22, at a birthday celebration for Mr. Kurniawan's father,

Mr. Kurniawan ordered a bottle of Opus One. He enjoyed the

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taste and learned that he had an unusual ability to discern subtle differences between one wine and another. This is from the defense submission. He began to hone this skill by purchasing wines from a local dealer in the Los Angeles area and then tasting them mostly at home. He would open three or four bottles, take and compare the wines, then return to them a day or two later and see if and how the taste had changed as the wine oxidized. Rudy began buying wines of increasing quality and corresponding price. This is from the defendant submission. Rudy started to attend wine tastings at the Red Carpet, a wine store in the Los Angeles area. The manager of the establishment noticed Rudy and invited him to some other tasting events. Rudy, still in his early twenties, was the youngest person present at these events. Soon the youngster became a prodigy as others began to note the sophistication of his palate.

The defense also notes that Mr. Kurniawan will not be eligible for release into a halfway house upon his release from custody as a result of his immigration status. What that means is that where there is, and there probably is in this case, an immigration hold on the defendant, if he were to be released from incarceration or whenever he is released from incarceration, he would not be at liberty, but he would be moved to an immigration facility and his incarceration would continue, particularly where, as here, there has been an order

of deportation.

The defense goes on to request from the Court a downward departure. This is the jargon of the sentencing guidelines, the older regime where the guidelines were mandatory, where one could still obtain relief from a guideline, even though it was mandatory, by one of several possible downward departures which the Court could make.

And here the defense, although we are not in the guideline regime, has made that application and points out that the guideline in the defense view, the guidelines substantially overstates the seriousness of the offenses of conviction, and in support the defense argues that the relative amount expended by each individual compared to his, each individual's personal wealth, and the relevance objective impact upon him as a result of having purchased fake line causes the valuation based merely on sums spent to be overstated. In other words, the impact on these buyers, many of whom were wealthy, is not as great as the impact might be on someone who didn't have that wealth, and that's one basis the defense is arguing for a lower sentence.

The defense is also seeking a lower sentence than the guideline range because of what it calls acceptance of responsibility by Mr. Kurniawan. And the defense in this context says that only by standing trial and allowing the evidence to be presented could Mr. Kurniawan create a record that will allow the Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit Court

of Appeals, to clearly focus on the relative importance of this search, which I mentioned a few minutes ago, as part of the proof presented against him.

Defense goes on to say that although Rudy did make the government prove its case, he neither testified nor presented affirmative evidence that he did not engage in the creation of some counterfeit or altered bottles of wine.

As part of the defense package there is also a letter from Mr. Kurniawan to the Court dated April 25, 2014.

Mr. Kurniawan states, among other things, the following: He says I make no excuses for what I did. What I did was wrong, not only legally, but also morally and socially. He goes on to say: Judge Berman, it is important for me to tell you that I understand what I did was wrong and that I am genuinely sorry for everything that I have done. I never meant for things to turn out as they did. I never meant to hurt or embarrass anyone. I am not evil or violent. And I am truly sorry for the shame and pain that I have brought on my family and the embarrassment I have brought on the people I wanted to be my friends. I am willing to make restitution to the people I took advantage of.

I found the letter to be helpful. I found one important point was missing from the letter in that the letter does not take explicit responsibility for the complex multimillion dollar mail and wire frauds found by the jury. So

it doesn't, in fact, say what it is that Mr. Kurniawan did that he is sorry for.

By submission dated May 12, 2014, the government seeks a sentence, as I said before, within the range that it calculated, of anywhere from 135 to 168 months. And the government asked the Court to take into consideration that the defendant does not receive any additional points or incremental penalty as a result of the grouping analysis and the crime committed against Fine Art Capital, Count Two. That's a little bit technical, but the point that the government is making there is that when I try to make before and when I said that the probation department's calculation I thought was overstated, because the probation department added Count Two on top of Count One. And under the guidelines the government does not believe, and I agree with the government in this respect, that there should be an additional penalty.

So the government's position is, in shorthand, that defendant is essentially benefitting from the fact that there is no incremental penalty for the fraud against Fine Art Capital. I think the government is correct in its analysis.

I'm sure the defense also agrees with that.

And the government argues further that Mr. Kurniawan's scheme was long lived and caused substantial economic harm.

Kurniawan sold millions of dollars of wine that was not genuine. And the government notes that a sentence within the

applicable guideline range, which they feel, again, is 135 to 168 months, would help send a message to or deter other wine counterfeiters. The message would be that, quote, cheating others out of their money is a serious crime that will result in substantial jail time. As I said before, I agreed to this extent, and that is that I do feel that deterrence is a key aspect of today's sentencing. I think I might stop here for a little bit of a pause and turn to Mr. Mooney and Mr. Kurniawan, if he wishes to be heard, doesn't have to be and to the government or any aspect of presentation that you wish to make on behalf of your clients.

MR. MOONEY: Thank you, your Honor.

First of all, I do believe that Mr. Kurniawan does have something that he wants to say to the Court.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I'm really sorry. I meant everything I said in the letter. I thought about a lot of things in the last two and a half years. Now I just want to be able to take care of my mom, who is not in good health. That's all that matters. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MOONEY: The Court has been helpful this morning in laying out the foundation and the background of where we find ourselves at this point. This case is unique because there is nothing similar out there. There have been other cases and other things involving people who have counterfeited

wines, who have sold counterfeit wines. Other than the single case in Europe that we made reference to in our pleadings, there have been no other cases. There are some new cases now also in Europe. This is the only one in a United States federal court.

It's also a unique case and it's really sort of our key point, because of what ends up being central to this. And it's the concept of bottles of wine that receive such a huge inflated value over what almost any of us can even comprehend that the numbers start to become frightening when we start to look at them and we add them all up.

That's why one of our key points with regards to all of this, and I think I really do want to start there and then maybe talk about some of the other technical things. One of our key points is the guided departure that's provided by 20(c) in 181.1.

One of the things that the commission understood -THE COURT: The sentencing commission.

MR. MOONEY: -- sentencing commission understood, when they created and put together the guidelines, was that there were going to be some artificial benchmarks that were going to be created to try to come up with a numerical evaluation of things. One of those was in what we see here with regards to economic crimes. Sort of made sense to say, well, let's look at things in terms of what the values of those things were

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because very often value will reflect what the harm is that was done. It's easy to see the sort of measure that it would create.

Your Honor is sitting here in this court, in the Southern District of New York, has obviously seen a lot of the cases that have come out some of the financial crimes involving a lot of activities that went on in the mid 2005 to 2010, to some degree ahead, prior to that.

Those cases ended up with a substantial amount of harm being done in many cases that could be measured to a great extent by the amount of money that was involved. Because in those cases people's retirement disappeared, charities, which depended upon monies which had been placed in the trust of other people, suddenly found that the money was gone. They could no longer do the things that they had planned to do before. As I said, people were not able to retire. They had to stay at work and continue to try to earn money because the money that they had collected and put together and had spent their life organizing to be able to allow them to live was gone. Companies had to close. People lost their jobs. was reigned throughout the country on the basis of what happened because the money that was lost in those cases was money that was dearly needed and very important to the people who had put that money up and who had put that money at risk and who had lost that money. The harm in those cases was, to a

great extent, adequately measured by the economic value of what wend forward. This case is different. This case is entirely different.

To begin with, it deals with something which was not purchased by people as a necessity. For the most part it wasn't even a real investment. Judge Oetken calls it sort of a hobby and it seems to fall within that category, although there is value and a person who buys one of these models and decides to put it back some place may well be counting on the thing having some value. And, of course, as we see from the listing that we get from Mr. Doyle that seems to have gone up in value, I don't know that that means that it's a place where people ought to go put any sort of investment.

And there is absolutely no evidence, no evidence whatsoever that anybody, any individual, any person ever bought these bottles with the idea of them being an investment.

And what they paid for them, what they paid for them is absolutely incomprehensible. We provided information that the average price in the United States paid by people for a bottle of wine is \$7. That surprised me. I expected it to be a much higher number. I traditionally spend more than that when I buy wine.

And when I saw the figures -- and it comes from the industry. There is a huge difference between \$7 and then -- it's absolutely astonishing. One of the wines that Mr. Doyle

has, a 1947 Chateau Chival Blanc, the second Jeroboam, \$231,748. I don't even want to think about what that translates into in price per drink, price per sip. One shouldn't have a thimble full of liquid that is worth more than somebody's paycheck. There shouldn't be a bottle of wine that's three times what people normally make in a year. And so it just completely misrepresents the actual value and the actual harm of what's done. That's the problem with looking at this at a strict number basis and that's why it suddenly shoots it up into the stratosphere. That's why we have suggested to your Honor that the guided departure for overrepresentation of value is appropriate. Nobody died. Nobody lost their savings. Nobody lost their job. Nobody was rendered devoid of things that they needed for their life.

Again, I think Judge Oetken says it well. He says the fraud in this case did not result in death, serious physical injury, or even minor physical injury. The fraud did not risk any such jury. The fraud did not result in a restriction of liberty or an insult. In this case he was talking about Mr. Koch's human dignity by way of discrimination. The fraud did not cause an economic loss that interrupted Koch's life by interference with his housing, employment, or saving for retirement, and the fraud did not involve any potential vulnerable victims. And all of the victims are in the same spot as Mr. Kurniawan. They are all the same.

THE COURT: Is the principle that if you are rich and you get your fraud in, the person who commits the fraud pays a lesser penalty?

MR. MOONEY: No, your Honor. What I'm saying is that if you defraud somebody who is very rich, even though the number may be bigger, you have to compare that number, using just that number.

THE COURT: What do you compare it to, that person's net worth?

MR. MOONEY: Perhaps. Or perhaps you look at the impact that it had on it. It would be different, I submit, if as a result of being defrauded, a rich person ends up having to make adjustments to their lifestyle that is impacted in some way. It's the impact that it has upon the person that you have to look at.

We gave the example in our papers of the theft of the very expensive car, \$200,000 Rolls-Royce. If you steal that car from somebody who has a garage full of cars, it's a \$200,000 loss, it's an inconvenience, it's an irritation, it's a crime. But you go steal the \$10,000 Ford from the business who relies upon that vehicle for transportation, maybe the crimes are equal --

THE COURT: You are saying that the theft of the Ford, that thief goes to jail for a longer period than the thief who steals the Rolls-Royce?

MR. MOONEY: Perhaps. But at least you don't say it's 20 times worse for the theft of the Rolls-Royce than it is for the theft of the Ford. In terms of the impact on the victim, they are at most the same. They are at worst the same. It certainly isn't a bigger impact on the person who owned the Rolls-Royce, because the value is greater. Doesn't that impact that person to a greater extent.

In terms of the amount that's available, if I went out and I bought a \$150 bottle of wine, and I don't often buy \$150 bottles of wine, and it turn out to be a bad bottle, counterfeit bottle, or spoiled or something wrong with it, I am going to be unhappy. I am going to be dissatisfied. But I haven't changed my lifestyle. I haven't been affected on any sort of an important level by that. And my \$150 bottle of wine isn't much different than the 5 or \$10,000 bottle of wine to the buyers in these cases. I think that's why Judge Oetken in the Greenberg case said, you have to look at it in terms of what the impact was on the people that were involved.

THE COURT: Judge Oetken, wasn't he in the throes of evaluating the jury's pretty substantial award of punitive damages and he found that to be excessive? While he did award punitive damages, the jury gave some \$365,000 in compensatory damages and then, if I remember correctly, some \$12 million in punitive damages.

MR. MOONEY: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Judge Oetken, what he was doing there, in the civil case, not in the criminal case, was reducing the amount of punitive damages.

MR. MOONEY: That's exactly what he was doing.

THE COURT: But punitive damages is quite a unique concept. And so some of the things that he said didn't hurt anybody, didn't cause him to change his lifestyle, didn't embarrass him, might be applicable to punitive damages. But you are saying we should apply them in this case to a sentencing. That's the argument you are making, right?

MR. MOONEY: I am, your Honor. I think there is relevance, because punitive damages are there for the purposes of punishing egregious behavior. It is interesting that Judge Oetken agreed with the jury's finding with regards to the egregious behavior. He did not say, no, no, no, the behavior was not as egregious in terms of the fraud that was committed. He went through and clicked it off one by one and said, yes, this was egregious, this was very fraudulent. He did it on purpose. There were no mitigating circumstances from the position of what Mr. Greenberg did in Judge Oetken's evaluation. But instead he said, because it is a punishment, you have to look at the harm that was done. And he said that the harm is overstated by the \$12 million and reduced it to 700,000. So he reduces it by 15 or so times what it would have been otherwise.

We are saying that that type of analysis is appropriate here. We are all fighting around \$20 million. We are all around that figure in terms of what we are talking about here. If you take that \$20 million figure and you reduce it by 20, you get down something closer to a million dollars, and something in that range makes more sense. We have even in our memorandum suggested that a 100 to 1 would make more sense of production.

THE COURT: Ratio of 100 to 1 would make more sense.

MR. MOONEY: Would make much more sense in terms of taking it down into a place that more meaningfully represents it. That's really -- and I think I've probably beat that horse to death. That's one of our most important issues with regards to this and I think this case has to be looked at in terms of this focus.

It's also important with regards to that to look at — and your Honor says deterrence is important and your Honor talked about the testimony from the winemakers. And their desire, obviously, is to see something happen with regards to this.

As your Honor knows, in this area, in white collar cases, very, very long sentences are not necessary for deterrence. In fact, the deterrent effect of a sentence between three years in prison and five years in prison or seven years in prison in a white collar case doesn't seem to change

much. The major thing that happens in white collar cases is the loss of reputation.

Mr. Kurniawan has been branded -- unlike many other people that may come into this court, this isn't just something that people can look up and find out about by looking at the court records. His name will always be linked with everything that we see in terms of all of these articles and everything that happened here. He will have no ability to ever escape from what has occurred.

THE COURT: That's what we call individual deterrence. But there is also a concept of general deterrence which might deter other people from engaging in that kind of behavior.

MR. MOONEY: This is true. But it does have an impact that way. Because what occurs is the information that gets out and the very knowledge that somebody looks at and says, this guy was able to counterfeit all of these wines and create all of this stuff. But look at what happened. He ended up being caught. He ended up being convicted. He ended up spending now 29 months locked up and not in an easy place. He has been here in a situation where if he had been convicted and given a three-year or four-year or five-year sentence two years ago, he would have been off in a much more pleasant place, still not a place that any of us, I think, want to sign up to spend time in, but certainly better than where he's been. That's something to take into consideration.

What my point is, in the white collar field it is not the length of sentence as much as the fall from grace and the inevitability of some sentence and some period of incarceration which has the effect.

And we cited in our papers another one of the judges in this district who specifically pointed out that that was the case, that in white collar cases lower sentences seem to be fine, but there was certainly no evidence presented that indicated that longer sentences in economic crimes and white collar cases would create a higher deterrent effect.

It's pretty easy because the kind of people that engage in these kinds of crimes are people who have been accepted into society. They have been recognized. They have built themselves up to the point that they now have accumulated some status. They don't plan to get caught. That's not what they are thinking about. And for these people to fall from grace and the loss of everything else that they have accumulated is usually much greater in terms of the impact that it has on them than is the dangerous venue spending time in prison.

I was talking about the United States v. Adelson case where the Court made reference to the fact that time in prison, incarceration itself, is a smaller deterrent effect. The reasons that we put people in prison, the number one reason we put people in prison is to try to protect society. There is no

evidence that that's necessary with regards to Mr. Kurniawan.

We have violent people out there that your Honor sees all the time that we need to keep locked up because these people are dangerous. We put people in prison sometimes because there is things we can do for them. They need drug treatment. They need education. There is things that can be done to help them out. That's not present in this case. All we are talking about here is the deterrent effect that it has for other people who look back at the sentence and the degree of punishment. And I submit to your Honor that in terms of both of those, the objectives are met by the publicity that he has been exposed to, the amount of forfeiture and fines or forfeiture that's been placed against him. There is a \$20 million forfeiture order that we have agreed to which liquidates all of his property.

THE COURT: That occurred on July 24, where you all signed an order of forfeiture in the amount of \$20 million.

MR. MOONEY: That's correct. We all agreed to that.

And that is a component of punishment because that's separate and apart from the restitution that he is going to have to make to people, which is another 20 plus million dollars that we have agreed to. There is substantial punishment that's already been in place. He has lost everything; most importantly, business reputation.

There is no need for further incarceration in this

case. The best thing for your Honor to do is get him out, let him go on with his life, let him learn from these events, and he has. He is sorry for what he did. He realizes how wrong it was.

The interesting thing is, with the ability that he had to create wines that tasted like the great wines, not just phony bottles, but wines that tasted like the great wines, all he had to have done was say, this is a wine that tastes like a 1945 DRC, not that it is a 1945 DRC, but it tastes like a 1945 DRC, and he would have been fine.

It's like the fairly well-known artist in Europe who created all of these paintings that could have passed for masters and, in fact, did pass for masters. We don't know where all of them are at this point. He has learned his lesson. He knows now. He is still creating them. Now he puts his own name on it.

THE COURT: There is a question I have not been able to find an answer in all of these submissions, and there have been dozens, from you, from the defense, from the government. We had the trial. I think nobody would dispute that if Mr. Kurniawan had turned his attention to productive or maybe he would have been a wine consultant or an expert or he would have been someone that you might consult before you buy a \$100,000 bottle of wine or any one of the number of things he had so many talents.

Why did he do what he did?

MR. MOONEY: He did what he did because it cost him to be accepted and recognized. He was insecure, very insecure because even though his family had wealth, it didn't have the kind of wealth that these other people had. They were a whole different scale. He wasn't as old as they were. They were all older.

And when he found some of these early bottles, through those he became accepted by these other people. He wanted to be there. He wanted to be a part of it. So he started to create things.

Then he gets hooked up with Acker Merral. And we haven't gone off into a lot of the things that happened there. But they start then feeding it. They start giving him money and saying, okay, we need wines. Go find these wines. We need wines for the auctions. And he can't perform. It's kind of like the athlete who has been hired based upon abilities that he does have, which are good abilities, but his abilities aren't going to be good enough to keep him in the game. So he starts to take drugs so that he can make up the difference.

And in Mr. Kurniawan's case he starts to create the wines because he can't find them. He is buying them. He bought \$40 million worth of wine, 40 million. 36 million of that we know was sold as part of what he put back into his sales. But he couldn't keep coming up with these great wines.

They just weren't there. But he could create them and he did.

The more he did, the more they gave him money, the more that he had to do more, and it just kept building up and building up. And it made him popular and gave him connections.

If you look at the e-mails, suddenly he's on a friend and first-name basis with people like David Doyle, with people like Michael Fascitelli. These are the kind of people that somebody like Rudy could never imagine he is going to be on a friend and first-name basis with as their supplier of this thing that they can't get, because nobody can get it. It isn't there. It's only there because he is creating it. He can become the supplier so he can become the friend. And he gets caught in that emotion of it.

The government wants to just make him a greedy person, but the evidence doesn't really support it, because the family had money. He spent \$40 million buying wine. Most of that came from money from the family. A lot of it came from the money of the other sales of things. He could have lived very comfortably and very nice without ever having to have gotten involved in any of this. But he wanted to be over here and recognized with these other people, and he got caught got up in that whole thing. He knows better than that. Besides, he ran forever. That's never going to happen again.

What has it done to the overall industry. Your Honor had mentioned the Chateaus. One of the things that's happened

is things are starting to change, things need to change.

Because we know, to say that Rudy Kurniawan is responsible for the counterfeits in the market would be absolutely unfair, too.

We know that the market is flooded with counterfeits. There is lots of counterfeits, not just the counterfeits that he made.

There were counterfeits before he even started ever doing it.

Mr. Greenberg's counterfeits didn't come primarily from Rudy. He bought those at Royal. Some of those may have come from Hardy Roedenstock. We know that there is lots of counterfeits. Mr. Ponsot said that 80 percent of what was there in the fine Burgundies were counterfeits. Things have changed.

The first thing that's changed is the Chateaus themselves, as a result of that, has started to look at this and said, we need to take some actions in order to provide some better protections. That's one of the things that has happened on a positive note.

A second positive thing that has happened is some of the experts, some of the people who have been looking at bottles have studied this. They have used this case as a basis for collecting information, and now being able to do very good evaluations and very meaningful evaluations of bottles that are out there. So there is an opportunity to get a better handle of this. That's what positively changed.

What hasn't positively changed. What hasn't

positively changed. Most of the auction houses putting some emphasis on having provenance in terms of the stuff that they sell.

THE COURT: They are or they are not?

MR. MOONEY: They are not. Instead, they just went to Hong Kong. And the Hong Kong market is flooded with counterfeits.

So is there a deterrence from this case? You would think there would be a deterrence. But they don't seem to care. They just moved out of the United States. That's their deterrence. Their deterrence is we will go someplace else because we don't want to be subject of having problems back here.

Mr. Koch went around and sued everybody. You would have thought that that would have fixed things. In some cases it had some ameliorative effect. Royal Wine Merchants has now agreed that they are not going to sell high-end wines, so Mr. Koch has had some impact on the market.

When it comes to the level of deterrence, I don't see a long sentence for Mr. Kurniawan being something that would deter somebody else from going out and counterfeiting wines. The people that are counterfeiting wines are probably doing it other places at this point. Instead, what has happened, which is similar to deterrence, is that an industry has looked at the practices involved and said, we have to make some changes in

term of how we do things, and that's starting to happen. And we have developed better experts and better tools for experts to be able to do things. There are positives that have come out of this case. It won't end it. It hasn't ended it. But it's unfair to say that this man is responsible. It's just not fair to do that.

I think the only guideline issue that we have got in terms -- I sort of moved backwards. The only guideline issue we have really got is whether it's over 20 or under 20, and we think it's just under 20. The government says it's someplace over 20.

We think part of the reason that you've got to do that is that you can't assume that every bottle that Mr. Kurniawan sold was a counterfeit because we know \$36 million worth of wine that he sold was wine that he bought. That's part of that. We know that that's in there. The government records show us that 36 million of what was sold was wine that he bought. And so we are assuming that the majority of that is going to be either good or, if it was counterfeit, it wasn't counterfeit that he knew about, counterfeit that he participated anywhere, counterfeit that he had a hand in.

We also know that the values should be what people paid, not the present value. Therefore, when you look at the information that was provided by Mr. Doyle, you can't take the 15 million or the 17 million because that's a current value,

and the values doesn't match up to what he paid. If you look, what he paid was half or less than that, based upon the records that have been provided to us to take a look at, so that doesn't work. The same thing applies to others.

Mr. Fascitelli. Mr. Fascitelli said, well, I paid \$5.5 million to buy wine. We also had the same thing with Mr. Doyle. Part of it was loans. People would make loans. Doyle loaned him a million and a half dollars. Fascitelli loaned him a huge amount of money. Part of it was anticipation that there would be wines in the future that they would receive.

Mr. Egan, when he did the evaluation of the Fascitelli wines, the stuff that he evaluated in the one report comes up as 69 percent. That's why we said, okay, that's a figure you can use. In his testimony he talked about \$1.2 million in terms of wines that he had looked at, a good portion of which were Mr. Fascitelli's. One of those figures would certainly make more sense with regards to Mr. Fascitelli. Part of the problem is that those numbers have not been well established for the purposes of loss.

The government has talked about people who turned their wines back into Acker. Those people were people that should be included. But that is improper, too. Because there was 100 percent return policy. All that means is that after there was controversy over the wines, people didn't want the product. I may have purchased a General Motors car that has a

faulty ignition switch on it. Then again, it may not have a faulty ignition switch.

But when the recall notice comes out, I take it in to have it fixed or repaired, whether it's bad or not. And the fact that I took it back in to be fixed doesn't mean it was faulty.

So the fact that people returned their wine without some other evaluation of that wine does not mean that there was a thing wrong with any of those bottles. They well could be part of that \$36 million worth of wine that we know was purchased and sold. All they were doing was using the availability of the return policy to get it back and why not. They spent money on it. There was some question about it. They don't have to go see if there is anything wrong with it. They just return it.

It's interesting that we have no idea whatever happened to any of those bottles. Acker didn't report, well, we have all these bottles that we took back from people and we had them all tested, they are all bad. I suspect they were all resold. We don't know where they are. That's what I suspect happened to them. And Acker is not stepping up. Acker has never come forward at all and said, we have got bad bottles. So none of that could be counted for the purposes of loss, because it hasn't been established. It's not enough of a basis there. On that basis we think that the numbers should be under

the 20 million, based what has been established and what we have agreed to in terms of what's appropriate.

THE COURT: Not 19.2 million?

MR. MOONEY: 19.2. It doesn't make any difference.

It could be 19.9 or 2 million and 1. We are saying it should be under the 20 million, not over the 20 million.

THE COURT: It's a lot closer to 20 than it is to say 10.

MR. MOONEY: It is closer to 20 than it is to 10.

Unfortunately, we use a cliff system for all of these things.

You hit the cliff, you drop over the two extra points. And the two extra points make a difference. The government has the obligation to establish it. And there is doubt here and the benefit of the doubt ought to be given to Mr. Kurniawan to say, okay, it's close to \$20 million, but it hasn't been established to go over the \$20 million. Therefore, we will keep it down there.

Unless your Honor has any questions, that's all I've got.

THE COURT: Why don't we hear from Mr. Okula and then we will take a little break and we will resume with the sentencing. Is that all right?

MR. OKULA: Yes, thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, the presentation that you heard from Mr. Mooney is quite shocking on a number of levels because he

is essentially arguing not only with respect to guidelines calculation but for 3553 factors that there should be two standards that your Honor applies. Your Honor should apply two standards, a different standard for one who carries out an audacious years—long fraud scheme like Mr. Kurniawan did, as the jury found. He should be treated differently and less harshly than people who commit other types of crimes, like violent crimes.

That's shocking, your Honor. It's shocking on a number of levels. One, it's not contemplated or even discussed in the guidelines. There is no distinction between someone who victimizes somebody by selling phony Tiffany watches, phony \$5,000 bottles of wine, or the most inexpensive piece of property.

Your Honor, fraud is fraud, and the defendant carried out an audacious, multiyear fraud scheme and there is no distinction in a guidelines or logic for treating it differently. Indeed, the guidelines do make an accommodation for the situation that Mr. Mooney is talking about, but in the opposite way that he is arguing. In particular, your Honor, what Mr. Mooney was saying, these are not people who were vulnerable victims. These are not people that when they lost their property they were put on public assistance or the like.

There is a specific guidelines adjustment for vulnerable victims. So the guidelines takes that into account,

your Honor, and increases the guidelines when people like that are victimized. It draws no distinction between a person who is making \$20,000 a year, \$50,000 a year, or a person who is a multimillionaire.

Let me be perfectly clear, your Honor. We didn't bring this case because we are carrying water for the people who were the principal purchasers of these expensive bottles of wine. We did it for one simple reason, is that the defendant carried out a fraud scheme, and we don't draw distinctions between whether the victims are wealthy or whether the victims are not wealthy. Fraud is fraud. And the defendant happened to run into the perfect storm of having as an investigator the FBI's foremost art and counterfeit expert in terms of Jim Wynne, the special agent who was originally on this case.

But for the work of Mr. Wynne and Mr. Hernandez at the outset of this case, the defendant could still be selling the counterfeit bottles. Indeed, and I'll get to this in a few moments when we talk about the intended loss, your Honor saw that tens of thousands of labels that were recovered from his residence.

But for him having been found out through the work of Agent Wynne and others and the materials that were recovered in the search, he likely would still be doing what he's doing today.

Your Honor, our point is this. There is no

distinction in either the terms of the guidelines or the application notes for giving any adjustment or any downward adjustment based on the loss figures simply because the principal victims here are people who were part of the 1 percent.

Indeed, your Honor, I think although they are not technically restitution victims in this case, an important 3553 factor for your Honor to consider, and one that your Honor alluded to earlier, are the victims like Laurent Ponsot, who testified so eloquently about the harm to his product, his baby, what he spent years cultivating and creating.

Once again, they are not strictly restitution victims in this case. But to hear from Laurent Ponsot how there is going to be eternal doubts about whether the bottles that are purchased in the market are good or not good, based on the work of this man, for proliferating the creation of those phony bottles, victims like that, indirect victims to be sure, but victims like Ponsot and the other owners of the domaines that were principally victimized the through the defendant's scheme should be given significant consideration. And, if anything, your Honor, it should be a basis for a higher-end guideline than some sort of reduction.

Your Honor, we urge you in the most emphatic way to reject the argument that people should be treated in a different way under the guidelines simply because what number

is reported on their tax return.

This is no principal difference, your Honor, for treating a white collar defendant different from an inner city defendant for incapacitation and for general deterrence purposes.

Now, I concede readily, your Honor, that the argument for general deterrence is the important one here rather than incapacitation. But you should not buy into the argument that simply because this is a white collar case that the guidelines are relatively irrelevant and you should not figure or consider the loss amount. Your Honor, the defendant knew and understood what the potential scope of his fraud was. In fact, it was his aim not simply to fit in to purchase or to create these bogus bottles because he wanted to be with the crowd, the elite Burgundy tasters at these dinners. He did it for money. He could have fit in with that group by bringing his bottles, his bogus bottles, to the dinners without defrauding all of those people, but he did it for the money.

Your Honor, there are some unbelievably devastating and revealing e-mails that speak directly to what the defendant's attempt, what he attempted to do here is. And the one attached to our sentencing memo, which was an April 21 e-mail from the defendant to Michael Fascitelli. Your Honor, this e-mail itself is enough to put your Honor over the \$20 million mark and, in fact, closer to 50 million.

In that e-mail the defendant, through his conniving, through his misrepresenting, through his luring, really, his lulling of Fascitelli, trying to sell him \$30 million of bogus wines, listen to what he says. He said: This is just my suggestion, which I think is safest and best for you. We can go over the original list. He is referring to an original list of elite wines that defendant had sent to Fascitelli. And this list, when we meet up in New York and I explain to you in detail why this and that, et cetera, Burgundies, I barely tweaked, as it's where the most money can be made quickly for you.

So what he is suggesting, and this directly refutes
Mr. Mooney's point whether there is any proof whether anybody
did this for investment, Mr. Kurniawan is indicating right here
that he understood that Fascitelli was holding some of these
for possible resale and, in fact, he is suggesting that you can
hold them and they will bring money on resale.

But he says, I have strong buyers in that category of old stuff in DRC, referring to the names de Villane, Roumier, and Conti. What he's saying is, Mr. Kurniawan is suggesting that Fascitelli buy this 30 million dollar bottle of wine, and then he sold him out in the future saying, I have all these buyers that can circle back and you will make money when you can resell it to them, and he says it in the next paragraph as well. He is trying to lure him in by suggesting he is giving

him a big discount on this \$30 million price. The defendant says, I changed the discount at 35 percent parenthetically. You've got your wish. And came up to 30 million and change. And then he discusses more about how he, Rudy Kurniawan, can bring purchasers of the Fascitelli wine and how the amounts will increase in the future.

Why is this important, your Honor? Because it directly refutes a number of things that Mr. Mooney just said to you. One, he tried to do a -- No. He tried to take by fraud \$30 million from Mr. Fascitelli. Two, none of the victims were really doing this for investment. Untrue. Here he is specifically contemplating that Fascitelli is doing it for investment, and he is holding out the potential that he, Rudy, will bring buyers to Fascitelli. So it directly undercuts it.

And Mr. Mooney said, well, you know, he had family money. He really did this to fit in. Did he need the Lamborghini just to fit in, Judge. Did he need all the watches, high-end watches that he bought just to fit in. Did he need the two homes to fit in. Did he need to buy interests in these elite Los Angeles restaurants like Comme Ca and Mozza. No. He did it because he wanted to line his own pockets. He did it to line his own pockets. It's the most rudimentary elemental aspect of a fraud scheme. The defendant wanted to take money by fraud and that's what this case is about, Judge.

You should not draw any distinction between the kingpin of counterfeiters, like Rudy Kurniawan, and say that sentencing to jail is unimportant in white collar cases. In fact, it's dramatically important for general deterrence purposes.

Your Honor, I spent the last couple of years essentially prosecuting the analogue of Rudy Kurniawan in the tax fraud area, and that defendant was sentenced a couple of weeks ago. He was, by many measures, the most prolific, prodigious purveyor of fraudulent tax shelters responsible for an amount that passed virtually anyone else, \$3 billion of fraud. And there was a 15-year sentence imposed in that case. It was a dramatic reduction of what the guidelines called for.

But, your Honor, the sentencing judge in that case recognized that the message had to go out that white collar cases are not victimless cases and in that case the victims were the Federal Government, the treasury, and the state treasuries. Here, the victims of the defendant are the people who bought his fraudulent line and the owners of the domaines, who had their reputation of their wines sullied and forever called into question in the future as a result of his activity.

To be sure, your Honor, the numbers are less for specific guidelines, but they call out for, I emphatically urge you, for a guidelines sentence in this case. There are no mitigating factors that suggest that a reduction of the

applicable guidelines is appropriate here. It was in unparallel duration. He did it for years and years and years. When people called him on it, he lied to them, lied to them over and over again.

You remember the testimony of Ponsot. How when he tried to confront the defendant, to get to the bottom, where did you get these wines, the defendant told him lie after lie, put him off, wouldn't tell him the truth. He had a time then to come clean. He had a time to mend his reputation and to give up the ghost and say, okay, these are all fraud. But he wanted the money. He wanted to keep going. He wanted to continue to sell his fraudulent wines. Your Honor, there are no mitigating factors here.

Your Honor, turning quickly to the guidelines issue, as I just alluded to, the Fascitelli e-mail in itself puts your Honor over the \$20 million amount. I don't know how much more your Honor wants to hear, if that's important.

But with respect to a couple of other victims,

Mr. Mooney referred to Acker Merral and how those returns

shouldn't count for intended loss. He disregarded totally

Mr. Frischman's evidence with respect to the \$2 million or so

of fraudulent wines the defendant consigned to Hart Davis Hart

in Chicago that he tried to sell. Those in and of itself put

them over the \$2 million amount.

Your Honor, as we cited to the cases in the

counterfeiting area, where somebody who possesses additional counterfeit and is caught at that time, the defendant was caught with what could be sold as millions or tens of millions of dollars of additional bottles to prove the fraudulent labels that he had in his residence. That, standing alone, is enough to put you over the \$20 million amount.

Your Honor, unless you have specific questions, I would like to conclude. Your Honor, the defendant approached his victims. He promised to his victims that he was selling them. Ron Cruz.

At the end of the day, Judge, what this case really came down to was a defendant carrying out a brand con and he should be punished for that. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: When you ask for a guidelines sentence, you mean a sentence specifically of what?

MR. OKULA: Well, we have a respectful difference of opinion, your Honor, with respect to the application of the more than 10 victims adjustment. I know your Honor's preliminary view on that. I think the cases make clear that even someone who is victimized, someone like Don Stott, someone like Hart Davis Hart determined that they have been defrauded. Even if they don't know the identity of the person who defrauded them, and that's one of the points of points that it made, that they relied on some of the testimony on

point in time whether the defendant was the creator of the fraudulent wines or whether he had innocently come into the fraudulent wine.

But what is not in dispute, I suggest, your Honor, is that people who receive these bottles knew they had been defrauded because they received counterfeit bottles. And they returned them after they made the determination that they were the victims of the fraud. I think, your Honor, under the guidelines, under the strict reading of that guideline, it does allow your Honor to count those people as victims.

Your Honor, in this 3553(a) land that we are now, the two-level adjustment, the difference between level 31 and 33 is not that important. I would suggest, your Honor, that certainly the recommendation of probation, which comes in at the guidelines level, even if you don't count more than 10 victims, of 108 to 120 some odd months is the appropriate number in this case.

THE COURT: Thanks very much.

We are going to take a 10-minute break and there is some painstaking work I still have to do to reconcile these numbers. Let's take a break.

(Recess)

THE COURT: We need to spend now a little time on this. It is a little painstaking. We need to do this. I have done, with the help of Christine Murray, a detailed analysis of

the record.

Incidentally, the record here is voluminous. In my notes, as of July 24, there were submissions dated May 1, written submissions, May 24, July 18 from the defense; and from the government, May 12, May 23, July 16, July 18, July 22, July 24, and now August 4. So everything I think that possibly could be said on these issues has been said. And those submissions have all been excellent, by the way, and very helpful.

We have been over all of them and where we could we did sort of a bottle-by-bottle analysis. And we do come up with the conclusion that the amount of loss exceeds 20 million. I'll give you the individual sums and you can total them up and you'll see I think it's probably closer to 30 or 30 plus million.

So the rule here is that the Court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss. We have done that. The estimate of the loss shall be based on available information, taking into account as appropriate and practicable under the circumstances. So that is sentencing guidelines 2B1.1, application note 3C. We also looked at <u>United States v.</u>

<u>Canova</u>, 412 F.3d 331, a Second Circuit case from 2005, and also <u>United States v. Townsley</u>. The Westlaw cite is 2012 WL 3137989. That's from the Northern District of California 2012.

And so here are the loss calculations based as much as

possible on a bottle-by-bottle review.

With regard to Michael Fascitelli, we compute the loss to be \$3,651,800. To get to this sum we reviewed expert reports prepared by Michael Egan. One report, dated August 2008 determined that some 60 percent of the wines were counterfeit. Another report, also in 2008, determined that 75 percent of the wines were counterfeit. We listed the wines determined by Mr. Egan to be counterfeit and then cross-referenced those wines with e-mails that Mr. Kurniawan sent to Michael Fascitelli and those e-mails are dated April 21, 2008 and to David Doyle dated June 12, 2007 in which Mr. Kurniawan offered to sell Fascitelli and Doyle wines for certain specific discounted prices.

So the Court used the value of the wines set forth in Mr. Kurniawan's own e-mails to ascribe a value to each of the counterfeit bottles. I think this is a conservative estimate, so to speak, or conservative calculation, rather, not estimate, which gives the defense the benefit of the doubt.

With regard to David Doyle, we ascribe a loss amount of \$13,611,990. This is based on an affidavit dated July 16, 2004 of Susan Twellman, who is the estate manager for David Doyle, and the government's supplemental submission dated July 18, 2014 of 15.111990 reflects the wire and property transfers made to Kurniawan from Susan Twellman on behalf of David Doyle and that is not disputed. That number is not disputed by the

defense and it's reflected in Susan Twellman's affidavit dated July 16, 2014.

The \$15,111,990 amount is further reduced by 1.5 million as that amount, as the defense accurately points out, was a cash advance and was not directly connected to any purchase of wine.

The Twellman affidavit incidentally contains a 16-page bottle-by-bottle description of 1590 bottles of wine and their current value, if the wine were genuine, that were purchased by Doyle from Mr. Kurniawan, and a separate four-page bottle-by-bottle description of 217 bottles of wine and their current value if the wine were not counterfeit that were purchased by Doyle from Kurniawan through Acker Merral & Condit. A print expert named Barrett Deck, hired by Mr. Doyle, determined that less than approximately 1 percent of the wines were authentic, and thus the loss figure should be approximately \$15 million.

The report submitted by Maureen Downey dated August 2, 2014 confirms the analysis of the print expert hired by Mr. Doyle in that the sample of 232 bottles of wine of Mr. Doyle's evaluated by Ms. Down were all determined to be counterfeit.

By letter dated August 5, 2014, the defense accepts the conclusions reached in the report of Maureen Downey with respect to the David Doyle wines she analyzed, concluding that

each of the approximately 175 bottles of Doyle wines examined in Los Angeles and 24 bottles examined in New York were all counterfeit.

Ms. Twellman's affidavit of July 16, 2014 is instructive in another respect. She says that beyond the loss of Mr. Doyle's 19 million dollar investment, Rudy Kurniawan's actions represent utter personal betrayal. Mr. Doyle and I — this is Ms. Twellman talking — considered Rudy Kurniawan to be a good friend. We spent a great deal of time together and grew to trust him and value his friendship. However, it is now apparent that to Mr. Kurniawan his friendship with us was nothing more than a sham, a means to extract millions of dollars from Mr. Doyle using duplicity and deceit.

The result has been -- this is still Ms. Twellman speaking -- the result has been personally devastating to both Mr. Doyle and me. In addition, Mr. Kurniawan's scheme has severely damaged the rare fine wine market and has made the ability to invest in and trade old rare wines extremely difficult, without nearly perfect provenance and documentation, something often impossible to obtain. Authentic wines are now viewed with suspicion and have become severely impaired in the marketplace, making future recovery of investments in these rare wines questionable.

Moving along to Brian Devine, I have attributed a loss to him of \$5,320,602.50. Mr. Devine purchased wines from

someone named Leny Tan, which could not be consigned due to authenticity issues. Mr. Devine was advised by Zachy's that they would not offer for sale at any time any wine that he purchased from Leny Tan. It appears to the Court that Mr. Devine did, in fact, purchase wines from Kurniawan as Kurniawan was posing as Leny Tan. I'm referring to an e-mail dated September 20, 2003 from Brian Devine to Leny Tan.

The Court has also reviewed an affidavit from Brian Devine, dated June 29, 2014, in which Mr. Devine states, among other things, quote, I never knowingly purchased wine from Rudy Kurniawan. All of my purchases were done through Internet communications with a person named Leny Tan, a/k/a Lenywati Tan, a/k/a Nakasone Tan, which I have since been informed and believe were aliases for Rudy Kurniawan.

I originally purchased wine at a WineCommune auction from Lenywati Tan on February 26, 2003 and was thereafter introduced by Leny Tan to Rudy Kurniawan through e-mail.

During the period 2003 through 2005, I made numerous purchases of purportedly rare and expensive wine from Leny Tan, who purported to be acting as a broker for various sellers. I paid Leny Tan a total of \$5,320,602.50 corresponding to those purchases. And so I'm finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Brian Devine's loss was \$5,320,602.50.

Incidentally, all of these findings are by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the standard at

sentencing time on these issues.

So with regard to Andrew Hobson, the Court attributed a loss of \$3,118,856, which is the amount of wines purchased from Kurniawan by Hobson, and expert analysis conducted by Alan Frischman, who determined that the wines were fake. There is a submission dated July 16, 2014 from the government which contains a five-page summary of purchases of wines made and a four-page description of the counterfeit wines purchased.

William Koch, \$2,106,486 for loss purposes. You remember that Mr. Koch has, in effect, dropped out of the case in the sense that he reached a civil settlement with Mr. Kurniawan in California in a case that he brought against Mr. Kurniawan there. But still for loss purposes and intended loss purposes I have attributed 2,106,486 to Mr. Koch.

Reid Buerger, I have attributed for loss analysis \$192,254. To Spectrum Wine Auction I have attributed \$686,500. And with respect to individuals who purchased from Acker Merral & Condit and who received full refunds for their purchases, this would include: Donald Stott, Edward Milstein, Thomas Roberts, Pia Cattaneo, Gene Mulvihill, Tom Tuft, Robert Cane, Gary Hurvitz, Tom Evans, Jeffrey Levy, Benjamin Lewin, David Solomon. Although I could have used a loss figure and could have used the amount of their refund — because as is previously noted, the guidelines permit the fair market value of the property unlawfully taken to be used — I nevertheless

discounted their respective loss amounts to 70 percent, approximating the amount of wines that were counterfeited. That I did based on the testimony largely of Douglas Barzelay by referencing the tasting that he organized with Don Stott from the Cellar I and Cellar II wine sales. We tasted, I think, it ultimately came to 11 or 12 bottles -- this is from Mr. Barzelay speaking -- and six or seven of them were clearly fraudulent. So roughly 70 percent.

And as determined by the government expert, Michael Egan, somewhere between 60 and 75 percent of the wine purchased was counterfeit. I'm also relying on United States v. Brach, 942 F.2d, 141 Second Circuit case from 1991.

Continuing, with respect to Acker Merral & Condit and the April 20, 2008 Cellar III auction, the Court attributed the loss of \$450,000, which we discussed earlier, the value of domaine Ponsot wines removed from auction had that as a low estimate.

With regard to Hart Davis Hart Wine Company, I attributed a loss of \$2,613,860, which represent the attempted consignment by Kurniawan to Hart Davis Hart Wine Company in Chicago that was rejected because all or nearly all of the wine was fake. And I relied on the affidavit of Alan Frischman in this regard.

With respect to Mission Fine Wines, which we had put over from July 24 for a hearing today, the need for which has

been obviated, because the parties agree that the loss to be attributed to Mission Fine Wines is \$2 million. By letter dated August 5, 2014, the defense states that it accepts the conclusions reached by Downey with respect to the counterfeit wines examined at Mission Fine Wines and that the government and the defendant are in agreement that the appropriate restitution and guidelines figure for Mission Fine Wines is \$2 million. Counsel also advised the Court that Mission Fine Wines is in agreement, I think, with this figure.

With regard to Christies, I'm not attributing any loss based upon a lack of documentary evidence at this time, and so no loss attributed.

Two other issues that we need to resolve, two other legal arguments. As Mr. Okula has pointed out, it makes a difference in the guideline range as to the number of victims involved, victims being a term of art as described in the sentencing guidelines.

We have determined, I have, for guidelines analysis purposes that there were less than 10 victims, as defined in the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, which says that a victim is a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense. I'm citing United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d 40, a Second Circuit case from 2004. If you go, as Mr. Okula pointed out, to the application note 1 of sentencing guidelines 2B1.1, it defines victim as any person who sustained

any part of the actual loss permitted under section (b)(1).

And the conclusion is that as some of the alleged victims received full refunds from Acker Merral & Condit, I am not including those individuals as victims, pursuant to 2B1.1(b)(2) for purposes of enhancement.

Just so you know for the record, I have determined that there are seven victims, and they are Michael Fascitelli, Mission Fine Wines, Reid Buerger, Brian Devine, Andrew Hobson, David Doyle, and William Koch. We do have, the government and myself in this regard, a respectful disagreement.

One more issue, legal issue before we turn to the other factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The question about acceptance of responsibility requested by the defense. That is to say, Mr. Kurniawan's acceptance of responsibility. Even if we were in the guidelines regime, I don't believe that he would qualify here for acceptance of responsibility credit. Let me explain that.

United States Sentencing Guidelines 3E1.1, which is called acceptance of responsibility, says, among other things, that if the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by two levels. It goes on to say in B that if the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection A, the one I just read, the offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection A is level 16 or greater. And upon motion of the

government stating that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation of a prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparation for trial and permitting the government and the Court to allocate their resources efficiently, decrease the offense level one additional level.

So what does this mean? This means that if there is acceptance of responsibility as defined, you decrease the offense level by two and in some circumstances by one additional level. I don't believe that the arguments for acceptance of responsibility are persuasive here, and I would deny that application. It's clear to the Court that the defendant has not, in fact, either at the trial or even here during the sentencing phase, accepted responsibility for his illegal actions, except through a generalized statement, and I sincerely believe the statement that he is sorry for the position that he has placed himself in. He never specifies the details of what he did that he believes is wrong, legally wrong, with respect to the wine fraud. And with respect to the Fine Art Capital fraud also found by the jury, he makes no effort to justify that in any specificity either.

In his sentencing letter to the Court Mr. Kurniawan does not say what exactly he did that was illegal. What is he so sorry about. Which frauds. Mr. Mooney at trial said this.

What do we know. The first thing that we know is that in these wine markets counterfeits are rampant. And to a degree he, referring to Mr. Kurniawan, did commit wine heresy, but not the kind of wine heresy that constitutes a fraud because he wasn't doing it to defraud people. Did he go out there attempting to defraud people? No, he didn't. He went out there wanting to be part of the club, wanting to show off. Did that make him do some things that maybe he shouldn't have done? Perhaps. Probably. He may have gone out there, he may have messed with some of them. He may have recorked and reconditioned. They, the government, haven't proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, it is perfectly proper for counsel to make whatever arguments he has or at his disposal, so I'm not in any way suggesting that Mr. Mooney has done anything incorrect or wrong. But I think he does point out or it's clear to me that there is no evidence either in Mr. Kurniawan's statement or his letter to the Court or anywhere in the transcript that he takes specific responsibility for the crimes that the jury found that he has committed.

We also find in the transcript the following in the sentencing submissions. These are quotations. Rudy learned that everybody expected there to be counterfeits. In fact, part of the contest was to see who could figure out what was real and what was fraudulent. The remedies if you got a bad

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bottle were to drink it and point out how it was wrong, or just put it up for auction so that it would pass to the next quy down the line. Trying to keep up with the very wealthy members of the elite wine collector group was expensive, and Rudy started to see himself as part of their world. With the additional money coming in from the advances, he was able to play the part. But in doing so he was spending large sums. The required restaurants, clothing and jewelry were very expensive. The submission goes on to say: Individuals who can afford to pay thousands of dollars for a bottle of wine are members of a sophisticated class and have resources and extraordinary remedies at their fingertips. They have regular lawyers, sometimes phalanxes of them at their call. It is thus clear that the consequences of wronging them are not likely to go unpunished. They can and will take care of themselves.

To the high-end wine market, primarily represented by a small group of collectors and the auction houses that cater to them, seems to recognize, even accept that fraudulent wine is part of its culture. This is in the defense submission. It is of note that in spite of years of controversy, open general acknowledgement of the phenomena and many thousands of blog entries discussing what is real and what is not, the market has shown no inclination to correct itself. And then, finally, from the defense, it seems clear no matter how counterintuitive it may be, that no sentence that this Court imposes will have

any impact on this trade, the market, or its participants.

Only the buyers and sellers themselves can meaningfully affect this practice and protect themselves, and they can do it easily.

I am not so sure that those statements, me personally, I don't accept those statements as true. I do think that the Court can certainly, in part, impact fraudulent behavior, deter it to some extent in the course of today's sentencing. These arguments are unconvincing to me.

I note again that Mr. Kurniawan did not even address how he allegedly accepted responsibility for the fraud committed against Fine Art Capital except to note that Fine Art Capital was fully repaid, principal and interest, on its loan, and all costs incurred from the sale of the security pledged for the loan. I don't think that this is legally sufficient.

In the Court's view, the defendant has not clearly accepted responsibility for his actions, although surely he regrets the position he is now in. Although the defendant may not have testified at trial — incidentally, I find no fault in the fact that defendant went to trial. He has every right to do that, as every defendant does, because every defendant is presumed to be innocent unless and until the jury determines otherwise or there is a guilty plea. I'm not in the least bit faulting his exercise of his right to have a trial.

Although he did not testify at the trial and he had no

obligation to do that either, an affirmative defense was presented. Expert, Mr. C. Robert Collins testified, among other things, on behalf of the defense, that authentic wine can end up with many different labels. And when asked by defense counsel, and has that made it more difficult to identify the authenticity of many Burgundies, Mr. Collins replied, absolutely.

I think that disposes of the legal issues. Forfeiture has been done by consent. Number of victims I just indicated. Loss amount I just indicated. Restitution will we will come to later, but I don't think there is any difference or much difference at all between the defense and the government with respect to restitution.

Let's move to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and see if we can make some sense of this story here. If you analyze those factors, this is what stands out, at least to me.

As to the nature and circumstances of the offense, I think this was a very serious economic fraud or con — that word has been used, I think it applies — a very serious crime and a manipulation of the U.S. and international marketplace for the buying and selling of fine wine. It's not so much with respect to or is in addition with respect to any individuals who may have been harmed, but great harm, I think, by these behaviors pose a threat to the U.S. and international marketplace, not only for buying and selling fine wine, but for

other products as well.

Mr. Kurniawan burst on the Los Angeles scene in or about 2001 in his early twenties, presumably from a wealthy Indonesian family, and bedazzled the high-end U.S. wine market, no doubt, including many who perhaps should have known much better, with his expert palate, expensive clothes and cars and watches, his spectacular and seemingly generous tastings and buying dinners for which he invariably picked up the tab. His financial assets at one point were estimated to be in and around \$41 million, including world class art and a voracious appetite for buying and selling fine wine.

But at the heart of this crime, the con I would say,
Mr. Kurniawan cleverly over time included wine manufactured in
his Los Angeles kitchen and repackaged in empty famous vintage
bottles which he had sent to his home in and among the likely
genuine bottles of wine that he also sold, until rumors of
counterfeiting overtook him and these rumors became criminal
reality.

As to the history and characteristics of the defendant, we don't know much, but we have learned, it appears he comes from a wealthy Indonesian family of Chinese descent. Wealth is stated in the presentence investigation report to be in the field of real estate. He is educated and has lived in the United States since he has been 16 years of age, as far as I can tell. He has two brothers who were interviewed in

connection with the presentence investigation report, I think at my suggestion that there be family members interviewed. And they seem to think that this is just business and don't seem really to get the seriousness of Rudy's criminal convictions. His mother lives in Los Angeles, supported by the two brothers.

That's as much really as we know, as I know about Mr. Kurniawan's background.

The need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment, the Court finds, as noted, that Mr. Kurniawan's frauds are very serious because the amounts of money, the amount of loss is somewhere between 20 and \$50 million.

But perhaps even more important, because of the negative light they cast upon the marketplace and the good names of some of our leading institutions, not just in France, but here as well, some of our global trading partners, particularly in Burgundy, France, who, among others, helped burst the wine fraud Kurniawan bubble and crucially came to New York City to testify in the Kurniawan trial.

With respect to deterrence, here we speak both of specific and general deterrence and both are enormously important in this sentencing, perhaps general deterrence being more important. First, as to Mr. Kurniawan, that would be specific deterrence. We know what I've said about him

historically. But we don't know really what motivated this bold, grandiose, unscrupulous, but destined to fail con. We need a sentence that removes him from the marketplace to deter his further criminality.

Second, and, as I say, perhaps even more important than others, we need to make clear to other would-be counterfeiters or people who would defraud that they will receive significant punishment in the form of jail time if they attempt to manipulate our commerce and our trade relationships by committing fraud.

And then as to the factor of protecting the public from further crimes, many of the people who were directly impacted by Mr. Kurniawan's frauds are wealthy, and no doubt about that, and can take care of themselves pretty much as has been shown. We all recognize that.

But the public at large needs to know that our food and our drink are safe and are what's on the label and not some homemade and potentially unsafe witch's brew. And the public needs to know that our economic dealings are on the up and up and that our criminal justice system will do its part to help stamp out fraud.

There is another factor, providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care or other correctional treatment, that does not seem to be a significant factor in this case.

We look at the kind of sentences available, the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established in the sentencing guidelines, which, fundamentally, by my calculations, are 108 to 135 months of incarceration. We are looking at any policy statements issued by the sentencing commission, seek to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarity-situated defendants, and to provide for restitution.

As I've just mentioned, the applicable sentencing guideline range in this case is 108 to 135 months of incarceration. I computed the offense level to be 31 and the criminal history category to be I. I'm somewhat lower than the government, higher than the defendant, lower still than the probation department.

When you consider all of these 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, here is what conclusions I drew. Mr. Kurniawan is 37 years old. He resides in the U.S., without permission, after having been denied asylum in March 2001. He was ordered to self deport. He appealed that decision. The appeal was dismissed on or about March 25, 2003. And he was, again, ordered to deport within 30 days. He has a college education, appears to have been in the United States since the able of 16. He is a citizen of Indonesia and is in the U.S. illegally following the denial of his asylum petition. He is single, has no children. He appears to be from a wealthy Indonesian family of Chinese descent. He was raised in Indonesia by his parents

and at the age of 16 entered the U.S., from my understanding, legally, with a student visa. He lived for a time with two of his brothers in California. They now, as I understand it, live, one in Jakarta and the other in Hong Kong.

When the defendant was in his early twenties his mother entered the United States and the defendant thereafter resided with her in California where she, having been granted asylum, still lives. Defendant appears to have been an important caregiver for his mother, who is now approximately 66 years of age, and they speak by phone regularly. It appears that defendant's employment was exclusively related to the purchase and sale of wine. As I indicated before, both defendant's mother and two brothers were interviewed by the probation department.

Victims. I have noted before that I believe that there are seven, less than ten, that is. That impacts the offense level. I've taken that into account in arriving at an offense level of 31. I have looked at United States Sentencing Guidelines 2B1.1 and application note 1 and also United States v. Abiodun, 356 F.3d 162, a Second Circuit case from 2008.

Restitution. Restitution is owed to those individuals with identifiable actual losses. This is somewhat different and the restitution amount can and in this case is different than the loss amount. Because loss amounts include actual and intended loss, there are individuals or entities who have loss

amounts that are higher than their restitution amounts.

Restitution awarded by the Court is also reduced by any reimbursement already received by the victims. The restitution is payable to the clerk of court for disbursement to the following victims.

Before I get to those names, I want to use a moment to give you some more citations with respect to restitution. One is <u>United States v. Maurer</u>, 226 F.3d 150, Second Circuit case from 2000. Another is <u>United States v. Schwamborn</u>, 542, Fed Appx 87, a Second Circuit case from 2013. It's a summary order.

The persons to whom restitution is owed are the following: Formerly we had included Mr. Koch on the list. But as you know, by letter dated July 24, 2014, counsel for Mr. Koch said that he is withdrawing his claim for restitution in this case.

Michael Fascitelli, \$3,651,800, determined from expert reports of Mr. Fascitelli's wines and valuation provided by Mr. Kurniawan. By letter dated July 18, 2014, the defense has said the following: Mr. Fascitelli's claim for restitution should be reduced to 69 percent of the figure that he paid, 5.5 million, so that number came to 3,795,000. My figure is somewhat lower than that figure. This figure includes allowing the 69 percent even relating to wines for which he paid but never received. At the hearing argument on July 24, 2014,

defense counsel said it was our understanding that 5.5 million represents what Mr. Fascitelli bought all together. So the 69 percent is what we see when we look at these reports and, quite frankly, it's a fair figure to apply. We think it's an appropriate figure to apply, and we think it gives a fair number to Mr. Fascitelli. The defense number, as I say, is a little bit higher than the number I have come up with, and that number is \$3,651,800.

The number for Reid Buerger for restitution is \$192,254. That reflects the amount purchased from Acker Merral & Condit at the October 2006 auction that Mr. Buerger attempted to sell at another auction who questioned the authenticity of the wines. I think defense counsel agrees with this figure.

The number that I have come up with for David Doyle, restitution is \$15,111,000. I've used a figure that defense counsel has used, also. That is \$15,111,000.

Brian Devine, restitution, \$5,320,602.50. According to his affidavit, dated June 29, 2014, during the period 2003 to 2005, Mr. Devine made numerous purchases purportedly of rare and expensive wine from Leny Tan. These are the Leny Tan wines that I described before.

Andrew Hobson, \$3,118,856 restitution.

Jeffrey Levy listed by probation as a victim entitled to restitution. I don't think that is accurate and so I have not set a restitution amount for Mr. Levy.

Mission Fine Wines, there is agreement, as we have heard before, among the parties and also with the consent of Mission Fine Wines, that \$2 million is the appropriate restitution amount.

I think if you add these figures up, it will come to or pretty close to \$29,395,502.50. I'm sorry. That minimum should be \$28,405,502.50. I took off the \$990,000 to make my figures compatible with the defense figures. So the number is somewhat lower.

Forfeiture. Forfeiture is mandatory, even when restitution is also imposed. So there is forfeiture and restitution, not one or the other. These two aspects of a defendant's sentence serve distinct purposes. Restitution functions to compensate the victim whereas forfeiture acts to punish the wrongdoer. The two remedies need not be at cross purposes. Although it is not bound to do so, the government has the discretion to use forfeited assets to restore a victim whom the defendant has failed to compensate. The cite is United States v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137, a Fourth Circuit case from 2014.

As you have heard at the July 24, 2014 proceeding in this matter, the parties agreed to a forfeiture of \$20 million, and I signed an order to that effect. I have also reviewed the presentence investigation report in this case which was approved on July 7, 2014, together with an addendum of that

date, and there was a second addendum approved on that date, and a sentencing recommendation also of July 7, 2014.

Some but not all of the written submissions that I have received are dated July 18, 2014; May 24, 2014; May 1, 2014 from Mr. Mooney and Mr. Verdiramo; from the government dated July 18, 2014; July 16, 2014; May 23, 2014; and May 12, 2014. That was as of the July proceeding. There have been numerous additional submissions since then. There are also submissions dated April 25, 2014. May 23, 2014 is the letter from Mr. Koch. There is also a letter submitted to probation from Williams and Connelly dated June 18, 2014 on behalf of Reid Buerger.

So I would ask you, Mr. Mooney, if you and Mr. Kurniawan have had the opportunity to read and discuss the presentence investigation report as well as the addendum and sentencing recommendation and additional sentencing materials?

MR. MOONEY: Yes, your Honor, we have.

THE COURT: Mr. Kurniawan, you discussed those materials with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do either of you have any remaining objections to the contents of the presentence report?

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$  MOONEY: No, your Honor. I think the Court has corrected those problems.

THE COURT: Mr. Kurniawan, any? No.

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1 How about the government? 2 MR. OKULA: No, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: I will return the presentence report to 4 probation, which is our usual practice. 5 And at this time, if you wish, Mr. Mooney, 6 Mr. Kurniawan, and Mr. Okula can have another opportunity to 7 address the Court, if you would like to. You can also incorporate what you've said before, if you would prefer. 8 9 Mr. Mooney, anything further? 10 MR. MOONEY: Yes, your Honor. 11 I understand your Honor's concern with respect to the 12 potential impact of this case on international markets. I 13 think it overstates to a certain extent the nature of that 14 because this only deals with the very highest-priced portions 15 of it and, in fact, doesn't deal with anything that is in direct market from any of the vineyards. It deals --16

THE COURT: I am not sure I understand that.

MR. MOONEY: In other words, no product at these prices is being sold out of the vineyards. This is stuff that's been bottled. It's been sold. It's old.

THE COURT: Secondary market.

MR. MOONEY: Or tertiary or who knows how many times down there. Because what makes them valuable is, it's material that's still around after a really, really long time. It's like when I go into an old bookstore. I've got an early

edition of the writings of juveniles. My purchase or nonpurchase of that doesn't have any impact on the writer because he's been dead for a really long time. In fact, in the cases of many of these wines, one of the difficulties was that the winemakers have even been dead for a period of time. I think that's something to take into consideration when looking at it in terms of the markets. It did not directly impact the relationships of the markets.

THE COURT: We had three very much alive winemakers here in court testifying, and they are very much alive.

MR. MOONEY: They are very much alive and they came here and they testified. And they testified that this is a problem. And as we said before, one of the positives that came out of this case is the focus that it put on this and the fact that some practices are changing. Mr. Ponsot himself is the one that said, well, I first heard that people were counterfeiting some of my wines. And he first heard about it in the Hong Kong market, not something that was done to Mr. Kurniawan, but in the Hong Kong market, and said, I was flattered at first. And then later I decided, no, this is potentially a problem because people might taste it and it wasn't what it was supposed to be.

What happens is, the winemakers, the Chateaus, are taking additional efforts now to make sure that wines are going to be registered, that the bottles are going to be marked on

the high end. We will have a better system to be able to look at. If you go back and look at the letter from Devine, when he was sent the Mission wines to look at, several of which he actually authenticated, he said in there, one of the problems with early wines is that different printing was used, different labels were used. Nobody cared very much about those things. Now they care. Now they are taking efforts. There have been changes that are made that are actually positive changes.

That's not to say that punishment isn't appropriate and some deterrence isn't appropriate. I just think it's important to note that perhaps some good in some ways is coming out of this, although from everything else that I'm hearing, it doesn't seem to have changed anything that's going on in Hong Kong, although interestingly, as we pointed out, the Susan Twellman affidavit, which has the inventory, and she says in her affidavit on the one hand, well, the market has been affected. But then on the other side you look at the current values of these wines.

What Mr. Doyle is holding, according to what
Mr. Doyle's people are telling us now, would have been worth
twice the amount that he paid for it. So the market doesn't
seem to have been deflated by virtue of this, because the
prices are up. The bottom certainly hasn't dropped out. There
have not been any economic injuries that have occurred as a
result of those things. That's, I think, our position. There

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is something that we think is important with regards to those aspects.

The Court has come up with a guideline, lower quideline level of 108 months. That's nine years. That's a That's a very, very long time under these circumstances. It's particularly long due to the fact that because of his immigration status, he would have to serve out a full 85 percent of that time. He wouldn't have any other options. And then he would be held -- when all of that was done, he served 85 percent of the guidelines sentence and then at the end of that period of time he would go over to the heads of the immigration, and who knows they would hold him before they finally would dispose of what they are doing. That in and of itself is something the Court could take into consideration. He would be entitled to up to 10 percent of that for halfway house release. Almost one year of a sentence would be time that a person who was in the country legally or citizen would potentially not have to face. He is not going to get any of those benefits.

Also because of his immigration status he is going to have some difficulties in placement. He would still qualify for a low-level facility, but he wouldn't be able to participate in any off-facility jobs, employment, or work like that. His immigration status will make him have to stay in the facility. That will make the service of time more difficult,

more complicated, and certainly not as commodious as somebody who does not have that impediment. Those are factors. His status, I think, are factors that I think the Court should take into consideration under 3553(a) in terms of imposing a sentence which is below the guideline parameter.

Further, as we have said before, even though the Court has determined that this is a serious financial fraud, and we don't argue with that, it's still important to note that the relative harm that was done to the various victims — again, I know I spent an awful lot of time talking about this. But the relative harm that I think would justify this Court in saying, I am going to come down a little bit, because people were not individually devastated. And there really wasn't the capacity, even, for people to be individually devastated. Did it have an impact on all sorts of thins that are going on? Yes, it did. Some of those are potentially good, some of those perhaps not so good.

As I said before, there is no bodies. Nobody died.

Nobody was seriously injured. Nobody suffered any kind of physical injury whatsoever from this. Is it important for us to know what's in the bottles that we are getting? It is.

There has never been any indication that Mr. Kurniawan put anything in these bottles other than wines which he had blended to taste like the great wines.

It's very interesting that Mr. Doyle drank a 1945 DRC,

one of the number one wines that everybody has pointed to that said, those were Rudy Kurniawan counterfeits, those were counterfeits, he drank one of those bottles with a number of other people, and they talked about it as being extraordinary. There was even a newspaper article that was written on how great this wine was that he drank. He was very careful about what he put in the bottles, very careful about what he put in the bottles. We are not having a situation where things were put into the bottles that could be harmful to people. There is no indication that anything happened that had any threat of harm whatsoever. We do agree that that's important, but it's important here that he was careful about what he put in.

And I think it's important that what he put in the bottles, he tried to put things in that would match the taste. He didn't just have the bottle with the label that he had put on it and people opened it up and it's just horrible. For the most part when people drank it, they thought it was the right thing.

We have another situation, another 1945 DRC. This is the one that was opened, everybody signed it, they drank it at the party here in New York. Mr. Devine came over himself and drank it. Everybody thought it was great. We don't know. Was that one that was real or was it one that Mr. Kurniawan made. For the most part, one of the reasons this went on for a fair amount of period of time was the stuff that he made tasted

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right. People still got the experience. They did get the experience. It was different than just saying, okay, I'm going to phony up the label and then I am going to put stuff in it that's going to be awful when people drink it. That didn't happen. I think that's a factor that can be considered.

Look at the bottles. Look at the evidence from trial about what he was buying to put in. He was spending 2 or \$300 a bottle for the wines that he was getting, that he was mixing together to put into the bottles. He wasn't putting in the \$7 wine that is the average wine that we hear about from people. It's a very expensive wine. It wasn't what people were buying. No, it wasn't. We never maintained that it was. It was not. It was absolutely not what they were buying. They paying for something else. What they got was a replica. It wasn't a bad replica, but it was a replica that certainly wasn't worth it. They should not have been selling it for \$10,000, or \$5,000, or \$4,000. He should have been selling it for \$300 to \$400. He didn't do that. He committed a crime. He committed fraud. Nine years is just way too long for that. Just way too long for that, your Honor. A substantially shorter sentence would still send all the messages that the Court wants and would be an appropriate disposition in this case.

THE COURT: Mr. Kurniawan, did you want to add anything?

THE DEFENDANT: No. I'm just really sorry.

THE COURT: Mr. Okula.

MR. OKULA: Your Honor, we have gone on at some length. I just want to make two quick points and I'll be very brief, your Honor.

To the extent that Mr. Mooney is arguing that the defendant's fraud, inasmuch as it has caused a change in practices by the wine industry that he should be given some credit for that, the Court should reject that. The fact that the bank may put up safety screens after they have been robbed by a bank robber doesn't mean that the bank robber deserves credit because they have caused a bank to be more careful. So, too, here in the fraud, your Honor. Maybe we should have taken a lot of steps earlier to try to put in anticounterfeit devices. But the fact that the defendant's fraud caused him to do that doesn't mean that he deserves credit.

The second point, very briefly, your Honor, is one to pick up on something that you observed earlier. That is, that no one really knows what's in those bottles. The defendant doesn't certainly have the safety precautions in place in his kitchen to make sure that something isn't going to go awry with what he's putting in the bottles. As Mr. Mooney just conceded, what he was selling, what he was doing in lying to people was giving them something that was grossly inferior.

Your Honor referred earlier to the jargon of the sentencing guidelines. Using the jargon of the wine industry,

your Honor, what the defendant was doing was engaging in the prolific prevail of plonk. It's a reference to inferior, grossly inferior wine and that's what he was doing. He was lying to people, taking their money and giving them plonk. For that he deserves, based on his serious offense, a serious sentence.

THE COURT: I am going to adopt the findings of fact in the presentence report unless defense counsel has any further objections.

MR. MOONEY: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Kurniawan, any further objections?

No. How about the government?

MR. OKULA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am going to state the sentence I intend to impose and then I am going to impose it.

The guideline range, as I've calculated it, is 108 to 135 months. The offense level is 31. The criminal history category is I. I intend to impose a sentence of 120 months of incarceration. I intend, also, to impose a term of supervised release following incarceration of three years, subject to what are called the mandatory conditions which are that defendant not commit another federal, state, or local crime; two, that he not illegally possess a controlled substance; three, that he not possess a firearm, dangerous weapon or destructive device; and, four, that he refrain from any unlawful use of a

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controlled substance. That he be required to submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on supervised release and at least two unscheduled drug tests thereafter as may be directed by the probation officer.

In addition, he will be required to comply with what are called standard conditions 1 through 13, plus these: shall be supervised in his district of residence. That assumes that there is no deportation. To the extent that assumes that in the event he were released for some reason in the United States, he would be subject to supervision in his district of residence. And in that case he would be required to report to probation within 48 hours of release from custody. He is required, also, to cooperate with the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services in connection with any proceedings they may bring to determine his status in the United States. And he will be required to abide by their rules, regulations, and laws. In addition, he is required to file all past tax returns, if that has not occurred, and pay all past due taxes, if there are any.

With respect to fine, I'm not imposing a fine. The financial penalties here are very steep and no fine is needed in addition.

I am imposing restitution, as I said before, in the amount of \$28,405,502.50, payable to the clerk of court for the benefit of the individuals that I identified who are entitled

to restitution.

How this is to be paid during the term of incarceration if the defendant is engaged in a BOP non-UNICOR work program, the defendant shall pay \$25 per quarter toward these criminal financial penalties. However, if he participates in a Bureau of Prisons' UNICOR program as a grade 1 through 4, to be required to pay 50 percent of his monthly UNICOR earnings toward the criminal financial penalties consistent with BOP regulations at 28 CFR 545.11. If any portion of the financial penalties remains unpaid at the time of Mr. Kurniawan's release from incarceration, the remainder shall be paid during the term of supervision in equal monthly installments.

We have also considered forfeiture, and I have signed an order of \$20 million forfeiture agreed to by the parties.

Going back for a moment to the payment schedule, I have considered the factors set forth at 18 United States Code Section 3663(a)(1)(B)(i) and 18, United States Code, Section 3664 in imposing restitution. Among other things, I have considered the amount of the loss sustained by victims as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant, and any dependents he may have and such other factors as I've deemed appropriate. In addition, I intend to impose a \$200 special assessment which is mandatory under 18

United States Code, Section 3013.

Briefly, the reasons for the sentence. First of all, the offense level is 31. The criminal history category is I. The guideline range is 108 to 135. I do believe that this sentence is appropriate in light of the factors which we have been analyzing most of this morning at 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). And I think that this sentence meets those criteria and objectives, considering the nature and circumstances of the offenses to be very serious, the history and characteristics of Mr. Kurniawan. I think this sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides a just punishment, affords adequate deterrence, both individual and general deterrence to criminal conduct, protects the public from further crimes.

And so before I actually impose that sentence, I will give defense counsel, Mr. Kurniawan, and the government one more opportunity to comment.

MR. OKULA: We have nothing further, your Honor.

MR. MOONEY: Your Honor, I will just say again I think for Mr. Kurniawan and for what he did and what he's involved in, I think that this is harsh. I would ask the Court to reconsider at least going to the lower level of the guideline, which would be 108 months. That's a substantial sentence. It's a guidelines sentence. It doesn't even move outside. It's a difference of only one year. But it's a significant

difference in terms of the potential impact upon Mr. Kurniawan. Again, in recognition of the fact that because of his status, there is so many benefits that he just won't have.

THE COURT: Mr. Kurniawan, anything further?
THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: I would ask you to please stand and I intend to impose the sentence.

So the guideline range, which is not mandatory, as we have said many times today, is 108 to 135 months. Having considered the factors at 18 United States Code Section 3553(a), it is my judgment that the defendant, Rudy Kurniawan, be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 120 months, followed by three years of supervision subject to the mandatory and special conditions that I mentioned before and incorporate here by reference. No fine.

Restitution in the total amount of \$28,405,502.50 to the individuals identified previously and incorporated here by reference. Payments to be made through the clerk of court. Forfeiture in the amount of \$20 million has already been agreed to. I also impose a \$200 special assessment which is due immediately and is mandatory.

And, again, I believe that this sentence comports with the criteria and factors at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), as I've discussed and we have been discussing for a good part of today.

And so I think this is the appropriate sentence. 1 2 Does either counsel, starting with the government, 3 know of any legal reason why this sentence should not be 4 imposed as so stated? 5 MR. OKULA: We do not, your Honor. 6 MR. MOONEY: No, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: I hereby order the sentence to be imposed as so stated. 8 9 Mr. Kurniawan, you have the right to appeal this sentence. If you are unable to pay the cost of an appeal, you 10 11 have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. 12 If you request, the clerk of court will prepare and file a 13 notice of appeal on your behalf immediately. 14 Do you understand your appeal rights? 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Any open counts or aspects of the case the 17 government was seeking to resolve? 18 MR. OKULA: No, your Honor. 19 Starting with the government, did you wish THE COURT: 20 to add anything to today's sentencing proceeding? 21 MR. OKULA: We do not, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: How about the defense. 23 MR. MOONEY: Your Honor, we would ask the Court to 24 recommend a designation to a facility in southern California,

specifically the Taft facility, which is near Bakersfield and

1	is the closest facility to where Mr. Kurniawan's mother lives.
2	THE COURT: Is it T-a-f-t?
3	MR. MOONEY: Yes, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: I will make that recommendation. It's in
5	or near Bakersfield?
6	MR. MOONEY: It's just outside of Bakersfield. It's
7	in Taft, California, which is close by there.
8	THE COURT: Mr. Okula, is there not an underlying
9	indictment here that we need to resolve?
10	MR. OKULA: I don't believe so, your Honor.
11	THE COURT: To the extent that there were, you would
12	ask me to dismiss it.
13	MR. OKULA: Most respectfully, yes, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: I think then I will make that
15	recommendation, counsel.
16	And I think that concludes our long work this morning.
17	And I wish you, Mr. Kurniawan, the very best of luck going
18	forward. Thanks very much.
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